Discrete-time uncertain processes, including discrete-time Markov processes, can be described mathematically in various ways. For many, measure theory is the preferred framework for describing the uncertain dynamics of such processes. We consider the alternative game-theoretic framework that was developed by Shafer and Vovk [5] . In particular, we study the mathematical properties of the upper expectations that appear in this theory. Some of these, including Doob's Convergence Theorem and Lévy's Zero-one Law, have already been proved by Shafer and Vovk.
I
Discrete-time uncertain processes, including discrete-time Markov processes, can be described mathematically in various ways. For many, measure theory is the preferred framework for describing the uncertain dynamics of such processes. We consider the alternative game-theoretic framework that was developed by Shafer and Vovk [5] . In particular, we study the mathematical properties of the upper expectations that appear in this theory. Some of these, including Doob's Convergence Theorem and Lévy's Zero-one Law, have already been proved by Shafer and Vovk.
For these results, our contribution consists in adapting them to our setting. However, we also present several results that, to the best of our knowledge, appear here for the first time. Important examples are continuity with respect to non-decreasing sequences and continuity with respect to specific sequences of so-called 'finitary' functions, which depend only on a finite number of states.
We start by introducing upper (and lower) expectations on extended real-valued functions that are bounded below and explore their relation to the well-known concept of coherence. These upper (and lower) expectations will then be used to model the dynamic behaviour of uncertain processes on a local level, allowing us to introduce the concept of a supermartingale; a particular kind of capital process that depends on the realisations of the process of interest. Subsequently, to model the dynamic behaviour of uncertain processes on a global level, we introduce a particular game-theoretic upper expectation operator that fundamentally relies on this concept of a supermartingale. The remainder of the paper provides an overview, where we prove various mathematical properties for this game-theoretic upper expectation. This article serves as a technical reference for an upcoming paper [8] that describes an alternative characterisation of this game-theoretic upper expectation as the most conservative uncertainty model satisfying a set of intuitive axioms. For this reason, we omit from the present text any elaborate discussion of the interpretation and consequences of our results. 
U E
We start this section with the introduction of a number of preliminary notions. We denote the set of all natural numbers, without 0, by N, and let N 0 ≔ N ∪ {0}. The set of extended real numbers is denoted by R ≔ R ∪ {+∞, −∞}. The set of positive real numbers is denoted by R > and the set of non-negative real numbers by R ≥ . We extend the partial order relation ≤ on R to R by positing that −∞ < c < +∞ for all c ∈ R. To model uncertainty, we will use upper and lower expectations. The following definition is similar to what Shafer and Vovk call an 'outer probability content' [7] .
Definition 1. Consider any non-empty set Y . Then we define an upper expectation E on L b (Y ) as an extended real-valued map on L b (Y ) that satisfies the following four axioms:
E1. E(c) = c for all c ∈ R;
E3. E(λ f ) = λE( f ) for all λ ∈ R > ∪ {+∞} and all non-negative f ∈ L b (Y ).
Alternatively, we can also consider the so-called conjugate lower expectation, defined by E( f ) ≔ −E(− f ) for all extended real variables f on Y that are bounded above. It clearly suffices to focus on only one of the two functionals and we will work mainly with upper expectations.
Note that in the definition above, as well as further on, we adopt the following conventions:
c + ∞ = +∞, +∞ + (+∞) = +∞, λ ⋅ (+∞) = +∞ and 0 ⋅ (+∞) = 0 for all real c and all λ ∈ R > ∪ {+∞}.
As a consequence of their defining axioms, it can be shown that upper expectations satisfy various additional properties.
Proposition 1. For any non-empty set Y and any upper expectation E on L b (Y ), we have that
E6. E( f + µ) = E( f ) + µ for all µ ∈ R ∪ {+∞} and all f ∈ L b (Y );
E7. E(λ f ) = λE( f ) for all λ ∈ R ≥ and all f ∈ L b (Y ).
E8. E( f + g) ≤ E( f ) + E(g) ≤ E( f + g) for all f , g ∈ L (Y );
E9. if lim n→+∞ sup f − f n = 0 then lim n→+∞ E( f ) − E( f n ) = 0 and lim n→+∞ E( f ) − E( f n ) = 0 for
Proof. E5: Consider any f ∈ L b (Y ). If sup f = +∞, we trivially have that E( f ) ≤ sup f . If sup f is real, it follows immediately from E4 that E( f ) ≤ E(sup f ) and therefore that E( f ) ≤ sup f because of E1. That sup f = −∞, is impossible because f is bounded below. To prove that −∞ < inf f ≤ E( f ), note that inf f is real or equal to +∞, because f is bounded below. Then for any real α < inf f we clearly have that α < f , implying by E4 and E1 that α < E( f ). Since this holds for any α < inf f we indeed have that inf f ≤ E( f ).
E6
: That E( f + µ) ≤ E( f ) + µ for all real µ and all f ∈ L b (Y ), follows directly from E2 and E1.
The other inequality follows from the fact that
for all f ∈ L (Y ) and all real µ. If µ = +∞, then since E( f ) > −∞ [because of E5], we are left to
show that E(+∞) = +∞, which follows trivially from E5.
E7: If λ is positive, this follows trivially from E3 and E6. If λ = 0, we have to prove that E(0) = 0, which follows immediately from E1.
E8: For all f , g ∈ L (Y ) we have that
where the last step follows from the definition of E. Hence, because E(g) is real by E5, we
have that E( f ) + E(g) ≤ E( f + g) for all f , g ∈ L (Y ). The proof of the remaining inequality is completely analogous; it suffices to replace E by E and f by g in the reasoning above.
E9: It is easy to see that, if lim n→+∞ sup f − f n = 0 for some sequence { f n } n∈N 0 in L (Y ), then f is also a gamble and so is each f − f n . Hence, it follows from E8 that
If we now apply E5 to E( f − f n ), and E5 and conjugacy to E( f − f n ), it follows from (1) that inf( f − f n ) ≤ E( f ) − E( f n ) ≤ sup( f − f n ) for all n ∈ N 0 . That lim n→+∞ E( f ) − E( f n ) = 0 then follows from lim n→+∞ sup f − f n = 0. The equality for the lower expectations E moreover follows immediately from conjugacy together with the fact that sup (− f ) − (− f n ) = sup f − f n .
If Y is a finite set, any upper expectation on L b (Y ) additionally satisfies continuity with respect to non-decreasing sequences.
Proposition 2. Consider a finite non-empty set Y and an upper expectation E on L b (Y )
. Then E satisfies E10. lim n→+∞ E( f n ) = E (lim n→+∞ f n ) for any non-decreasing sequence { f n } n∈N 0 in L b (Y ).
Proof. Consider any non-decreasing sequence { f n } n∈N 0 in L b (Y ) and let f ≔ lim n→+∞ f n . Note that then also f ∈ L b (Y ). Moreover, because { f n } n∈N 0 is uniformly bounded below [by inf f 0 ], we can assume without loss of generality that f and all f n are non-negative . Indeed, this can be achieved by adding the same sufficiently large constant to all of them and then applying E6.
Because { f n } n∈N 0 is non-decreasing, we have that f n ≤ f n+1 ≤ f for all n ∈ N 0 . Then it follows from E4 that E( f n ) ≤ E( f n+1 ) ≤ E( f ) for all n ∈ N 0 . Hence, lim n→+∞ E( f n ) exists and lim n→+∞ E( f n ) ≤ E( f ). To prove the converse inequality, let A ≔ {y ∈ Y ∶ f (y) = +∞} and consider the following two cases. If E(I A ) = 0, we have that
Because f I A c is real-valued [it cannot be −∞ because it is non-negative] and Y is finite, f I A c is a gamble and { f n I A c } n∈N 0 converges uniformly to f I A c . { f n I A c } n∈N 0 is moreover also a sequence of gambles because it converges non-decreasingly to the gamble f I A c . Hence, it follows from E9
which, together with Equation (2), leads to the desired inequality.
If E(I A ) = 0, we have that E(I A ) > 0 because of E5. Furthermore, all f n are non-negative, and
Since { f n } n∈N 0 converges to +∞ on A and A is moreover finite,we have that lim n→+∞ inf y∈A f n (y) = +∞. This implies, together with E(I A ) > 0 and (3), that lim n→+∞ E( f n ) = +∞. Hence, the desired inequality follows. 
One can easily show [10, 2.6 .1] that these coherence axioms imply the following additional properties, with E(
It should be clear that any upper expectation satisfies C1-C3 and therefore, that its restriction to L (Y ) is coherent. We now set out to prove that, if Y is finite, upper expectations can be characterised alternatively using C1-C3 and the following weakened version of E10:
We start with the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Consider any non-empty set Y and any extended real-valued map
Proof. Assume that E satisfies C1-C3 and E10*. We show that E then also satisfies E1-E4.
That E1 holds, follows immediately from C5. To prove E2, first note that, for any
there is always a non-decreasing sequence { f n } n∈N 0 in L (Y ) such that lim n→+∞ f n = f . To see this, it suffices to consider the sequence { f
y ∈ Y and all n ∈ N 0 . Hence, for any two f , g ∈ L b (Y ), we can consider two non-decreasing sequences { f n } n∈N 0 and {g n } n∈N 0 in L (Y ) that converge to f and g respectively. It then follows from E10* that lim n→+∞ E( f n ) = E( f ) and lim n→+∞ E(g n ) = E(g). Moreover, { f n + g n } n∈N 0 is also a non-decreasing sequence in L (Y ) and clearly lim n→+∞ ( f n + g n ) = f + g, which again implies by E10* that lim n→+∞ E( f n + g n ) = E( f + g). All together, we have that
which concludes the proof of E2.
We prove E4 in a similar way. Consider any f , g ∈ L b (Y ) such that f ≤ g, and the non- ) and therefore, because of E10*, also E( f ) ≤ E(g).
That E3 holds for real λ, can be proven as before by using a non-decreasing sequence of gambles and applying E10* and C3. For λ = +∞, we require the following more involved argument. Consider any non-negative f ∈ L b (Y ), fix an arbitrary c ∈ R > , and let f ∧c be the gamble
by E1, E4 and the non-negativity of f ∧c , and λ f = (+∞) f = (+∞) f ∧c = lim n→+∞ n f ∧c . Hence,
where the last equality follows because E( f ∧c ) ≥ 0 and the last inequality follows from the fact that λ = +∞ and 0
To see that the converse inequality holds, note that n f ≤ λ f for all n ∈ N and therefore that E(n f ) ≤ E(λ f ) because of E4. Applying E3 (we already proved that it holds for a real factor) then implies that nE( f ) ≤ E(λ f ) for all n ∈ N. Hence, taking into
Corollary 4. Consider any non-empty set Y and any extended real-valued map
satisfies C1-C3 and E10*. Then E also satisfies E10.
Proof. Consider any non-decreasing sequence { f n } n∈N 0 in L b (Y ) and let f ≔ lim n→+∞ f n . Let { f ∧n n } n∈N 0 be the sequence defined by f ∧n n (y) ≔ min{ f n (y), n} for all y ∈ Y and all n ∈ N 0 .
Clearly, { f ∧n n } n∈N 0 is then also a non-decreasing sequence in L b (Y ) that converges point-wise to f . It is moreover a sequence of gambles because every f n is also bounded above by n. Hence, by E10*,
Lemma 3 guarantees that E is an upper expectation, implying that it satisfies E4. Hence,
, it suffices to note that f ≥ f n and again apply E4.
Proposition 5. Consider any finite non-empty set Y and any extended real-valued map
Then E is an upper expectation if and only if it satisfies C1-C3 and E10*.
Proof. If E is an upper expectation, it trivially satisfies C1-C3. Moreover, E10* is also satisfied because of Proposition 2. The converse implication follows from Lemma 3.
We end by proving a convenient countable super-additivity property.
Lemma 6. Consider any non-empty set Y and any extended real
{g n } n∈N is non-decreasing because { f n } n∈N is non-negative. Moreover, it is clear that {g n } n∈N converges point-wise to ∑ n∈N f n . Hence, by Corollary 4, we can apply E10 to find that
where we can apply E2 because E is an upper expectation by Lemma 3.
Corollary 7. Consider any finite non-empty set Y and any upper expectation
Proof. This follows immediately from Lemma 6 and the fact that E satisfies C1-C3 and E10* by Proposition 5.
U P
We consider a sequence of uncertain states X 1 , X 2 , ..., X n , ... where the state X k at each discrete time k ∈ N takes values in some fixed non-empty finite set X , called the state space. Such a sequence will be called an uncertain (finite state) process. We call any x 1∶n ≔ (x 1 , ..., x n ) ∈ X 1∶n ≔ X n , for n ∈ N 0 , a situation and we denote the set of all situations by X * ≔ ∪ n∈N 0 X 1∶n . So any finite string of possible values for a sequence of consecutive states is called a situation. In particular, the unique empty string x 1∶0 , denoted by ◻, is called the initial situation, and X 1∶0 ≔ {◻}.
An infinite sequence of state values ω is called a path, and the set of all paths is called the sample space Ω ≔ X N . For any path ω ∈ Ω, the initial sequence that consists of its first n state values is a situation in X 1∶n that is denoted by ω n . The n-th state value is denoted by ω n ∈ X .
We will distinguish between local variables and global variables. A local variable is a variable on the set X of all state values, whereas a global variable is a variable on the set Ω of all paths. We will show below how we can associate a global variable with any local one. We denote the set of all global extended real variables by V ≔ L (Ω), and similarly for
For any natural k ≤ ℓ, we use X k∶ℓ to denote the global variable that assumes the value
.., ω ℓ ) on the path ω ∈ Ω. As such, the state X k = X k∶k at any discrete time k can also be regarded as a global variable. For any m, n ∈ N and any map f ∶ X n → R, we will write f (X m+1∶m+n ) to denote the extended real global variable defined by f (X m+1∶m+n ) ≔ f ○ X m+1∶m+n .
In particular, we can associate a global variable f (X n ) with any local variable f ∶ X → R and any index n ∈ N.
A collection of paths A ⊆ Ω is called an event. With any situation x 1∶n , we associate the cylinder event Γ(x 1∶n ) ≔ {ω ∈ Ω∶ ω n = x 1∶n }: the set of all paths ω ∈ Ω that 'go through' the situation x 1∶n .
Sometimes, when it is clear from the context, we will also use the notation 'x 1∶n ' to denote the set Γ(x 1∶n ). So for example, I x 1∶n is equal to I Γ(x 1∶n ) . Moreover, for any two variables g, h ∈ V and any situation s ∈ X * , we use g ≤ s f to denote that g(ω) ≤ f (ω) for all ω ∈ Γ(s), and similarly for ≥ s , > s and < s .
For a given n ∈ N 0 , we call a global variable f n-measurable if it is constant on the cylinder events Γ(x 1∶n ) for all x 1∶n ∈ X 1∶n , that is, if f =f (X 1∶n ) for some mapf on X n . We will then also use the notation f (x 1∶n ) for its constant value f (ω) on all paths ω ∈ Γ(x 1∶n ). Similarly, for a global variable f that only depends on the n-th state X n , we will use f (x n ) to denote its constant value on the event {ω ∈ Ω∶ ω n = x n }. We call a global variable f ∈ V finitary if it is n-measurable for some n ∈ N 0 .
We will also use the notation V lim for the set of all extended real global variables f that are the point-wise limit of some sequence of finitary variables. Furthermore, V b,lim is the set of all bounded below (extended real) variables in V lim , and V lim the set of all gambles in V lim .
Lemma 8.
For any f ∈ V, we have that f ∈ V b,lim if and only if f is the point-wise limit of some sequence { f n } n∈N 0 of n-measurable gambles that is uniformly bounded below such that f n ≤ sup f for all n ∈ N 0 .
If inf f ∈ R, then we can moreover guarantee that inf f ≤ f n for all n ∈ N 0 .
Proof. It is clear that any f ∈ V that is the point-wise limit of a sequence { f n } n∈N 0 of n-measurable gambles that is uniformly bounded below such that f n ≤ sup f for all n ∈ N 0 , is an element of V b,lim . So suppose that f ∈ V b,lim , meaning that f = lim n→+∞ g n is the point-wise limit of a sequence {g n } n∈N 0 of, possibly extended real, finitary variables. We first show that f is then also the limit of a sequence {h n } n∈N 0 of n-measurable variables.
Let h 0 ≔ c for some c ∈ R and γ(1) ≔ 0. Let {h n } n∈N 0 be defined by the following recursive expressions:
for all n ∈ N. The original sequence {g n } n∈N 0 is a subsequence of {h n } n∈N 0 . The additional elements in {h n } n∈N 0 clearly do not change the limit behaviour and therefore both limits are equal. We show by induction that {h n } n∈N 0 is a sequence of n-measurable variables, and hence f is a limit of n-measurable variables. h 0 = c is clearly 0-measurable. To prove the induction step, suppose that h n−1 is (n − 1)-measurable for some n ∈ N. Then either we have that g γ(n)
is n-measurable, which directly implies that h n = g γ(n) is n-measurable. Otherwise, h n is equal to h n−1 implying that h n is (n − 1)-measurable and therefore automatically n-measurable. This concludes the induction step and hence, f is a limit of n-measurable variables {h n } n∈N 0 .
To show that f is also a limit of a sequence { f n } n∈N 0 of n-measurable gambles that is uniformly bounded below such that f n ≤ sup f for all n ∈ N 0 , we first assume that inf f is real. Let { f n } n∈N 0 be the sequence defined by bounding each h n above by min{n, sup f } and below by inf f ; so
Then it is clear that { f n } n∈N 0 is a sequence of n-measurable gambles because {h n } n∈N 0 is a sequence of n-measurable (possibly extended real) variables. It also converges point-wise to f because
for any ω ∈ Ω. Since moreover inf f ≤ f n ≤ sup f for all n ∈ N 0 and { f n } n∈N 0 is uniformly bounded below [because inf f is real], we have immediately established both claims in the lemma if inf f is real. Finally, if inf f = +∞, implying that f = sup f = +∞, it suffices to consider the increasing sequence of gambles {n} n∈N 0 to see that the first claim in the lemma holds.
S
Any map P on X * is called a process. A real process P∶ X * → R is a real-valued map on X * and an extended real process P∶ X * → R is a extended real-valued map on X * . An extended real process is called positive (non-negative) if it is positive (non-negative) in every situation. An extended real process P is called bounded below if there is some M ∈ R such that P(s) ≥ M for all s ∈ X * . For any extended real process P we can consider the extended real variable P(X 1∶n ) ≔ P ○ X 1∶n that only depends of the first n states, and is therefore finitary. Moreover, with any situation s ∈ X * , we can associate the local variable P(s ⋅) ∈ L (X ) defined by
We will also use the extended real variables lim inf P ∈ V and lim sup P ∈ V, defined by:
for all ω ∈ Ω. If lim inf P = lim sup P, we denote their common value by lim P.
In a so-called imprecise probability tree we attach to each situation s ∈ X * a local uncertainty model: an upper expectation Q s on L b (X ). Since X is finite, Proposition 2 implies that Q s also satisfies E10. For a given imprecise probability tree, a supermartingale M is an extended real process that is bounded below and such that Q s (M (s ⋅)) ≤ M (s) for all s ∈ X * . In other words, a supermartingale is an extended real process that is bounded below and such that, according to the local models, is expected to decrease. The condition that
is well-defined because M , and therefore also the local variable M (s ⋅), is bounded below. We denote the set of all supermartingales for a given imprecise probability tree by M b .
Lemma 9.
Consider any supermartingale M ∈ M b and, for any B ∈ R, the real process M B defined by
Proof. It is clear that, since M is a bounded below extended real process, M B is a bounded below
where the first equality follows from the monotonicity E4 of Q s . If M (s) > B, it follows from M B (s ⋅) ≤ B and the monotonicity E4 of Q s that
Lemma 10. Consider any extended real process P that is bounded below and any path ω ∈ Ω. Then
Traditionally, the condition of being bounded below is not included as part of the definition of a supermartingale. However, introducing them without this additional requirement here would necessitate an additional extension of the domain of the local models and would therefore be rather cumbersome. Since we only consider supermartingales that are bounded below, we include this condition directly in their definition.
Proof. Consider any B ∈ R. It is easy to check that min B, lim inf
We prove the converse inequality by contradiction. Suppose that
Then there is some ǫ > 0 such that
from which we infer that
contradicting the definition of the supremum operator.
Lemma 11. Consider any supermartingale M ∈ M b and any situation s ∈ X * . Then
Proof. The proof is similar to that of [3, Lemma 1]. Since M is a supermartingale, we have
Hence, since X is finite, there is at least one x ∈ X such that M (sx) ≤ M (s). Repeating this argument over and over again, leads us to the conclusion that there is some ω ∈ Γ(s) such that 
Proof. We only prove the first statement, as the second is then trivially true. Since all M n have a common lower bound, say B ∈ R, the processes M n − B will be non-negative and they will moreover be supermartingales because of E6. Then because all λ n and all M n − B are nonnegative, the sum ∑ n∈N λ n [M n (s) − B] exists and is also non-negative for all s ∈ X * . To see that the non-negative process ∑ n∈N λ n [M n − B] is a supermartingale, fix any t ∈ X * and note that
where the first inequality follows from Corollary 7 [which we can apply because all λ n [M n (t ⋅) − B] are non-negative] and the sum on the right hand side of this inequality exists since all
) are non-negative because of E5 and the fact that all λ n [M n (t ⋅) − B] are non-negative. The last inequality follows from the fact that all M n − B are supermartingales.
+ λB is also a supermartingale because of E6 [which we can apply because λB ∈ R]. Moreover, for any t ∈ X * , we have that
where the second equality follows from the fact that ∑ n∈N λ n B is real and the third from the fact that B and all λ n are real. Hence, the process
which is a supermartingale, therefore proving the stated.
G -U E
Given an imprecise probability tree consisting of local upper expectations Q s for all s ∈ X * , we use its compatible set of supermartingales M b to construct a global uncertainty model E V as follows.
for all extended real variables f ∈ V and all s ∈ X * .
and all s ∈ X * . We will show later (see Corollary 26) that, for any s ∈ X * , the map E V (⋅ s)∶ V → R satisfies E1-E4 on V b . We will therefore call E V the global upper expectation corresponding to the considered probability tree.
In the remainder of this paper we will study this global upper expectation, proving several properties ranging from basic compatibility with the local models to more involved continuity properties. Before we do so, we want to stress that Definition 2 is mainly due to the work of Shafer and Vovk. However, they have been using many different versions of global upper expectations throughout their work. The link with our setting can therefore be rather unclear for readers that are not familiar with the theory. Hence, it seems appropriate to give a brief overview of how our work here relates to theirs.
Most of the definitions they consider only differ in how the supermartingales are allowed to behave. In [5] , they mainly consider supermartingales to be real-valued processes instead of extended real-valued ones. In [1, Chapter 6] they define global upper expectations on gambles using a version where supermartingales are not necesarily bounded below. However, this definition leads to undesirable behaviour when applying it to extended real variables, as shown in [3, Example 1]. In [7] , a version similar to Definition 2 with extended real-valued supermartingales that are bounded below is used. Because of the parallel between both definitions, we here chose to axiomatise the local models in a way that mimics theirs. However, as we have shown in Section 2, we can use an alternative characterisation based on coherence when considering local models on a finite state space X . As we intend to show elsewhere [8] , this characterisation allows for an intuitive and practically sensible way to motivate the framework.
From a technical point of view, we would like to point out that our axioms E1-E4 differ from Shafer and Vovk's axioms for an outer probability content, in the sense that E3 is stronger than their version of this axiom since it also allows λ to be +∞. As we have seen, this implies that, if the state space is finite, the local models are continuous with respect to non-decreasing sequences.
This is a property that will be essential in order to prove some of our results below. Shafer, Vovk and Takemura initially impose this continuity property as an extra axiom, but afterwards state that this continuity property is redundant to prove their results in [7] . However, their axioms of an outer probability content [1. -4.] are too weak to prove all of our results presented here.
Another difference is that our local models are only defined on L b (X ) and not on L (X ) as in their case. This does not make a difference regarding the definition of supermartingales -and therefore the definition of E V -since these supermartingales are required to be bounded below.
However, the advantage of our approach is that it implies that the global upper expectation is compatible with the local models on their entire domain. If the local models would be defined on the entire set L (X ) of all extended real variables on X , this is not necessarily the case, unless one imposes additional properties on the local models. We choose not to do so. Another difference is that Shafer and Vovk do not require the state space X to be finite. In that sense, their definition is more general.
Finally, we want to mention that some of our results, especially the ones in Section 7, were already proven by Shafer et. al., although typically for a slightly different setting. Sometimes, their results apply to a different domain, sometimes they prove these results within a different setting or using a different argument. We then often borrow their ideas and adapt them to our setting. When we do, we will mention this explicitly. Moreover, during the writing of this paper, it has come to our attention that some of the results that we present here are similar to the results in the soon to be released new book of Shafer and Vovk [6] . The extent to which these results coincide with ours, remains to be seen. An important exception are the results in Section 9, which, to the best of our knowledge, have never been considered by Shafer and Vovk, nor will be in their new book.
B P G -T U E
We use the convention that +∞−∞ = −∞+∞ = +∞. This is a typical choice when working with upper expectations, see [7] and [3] where they use the dual convention for lower expectations. If we would assume that +∞− ∞ = −∞+ ∞ = −∞, then the subadditivity property V2 below would for example not hold in general. We will henceforth use this convention without mentioning it explicitly. So, for example a ≥ b implies that a − b ≥ 0, but not necessarily 0 ≥ b − a for any two a and b in R. Moreover, we also assume that c
Proposition 13. For all extended real variables f , g ∈ V, all λ ∈ R ≥ , all µ ∈ R and all situations s ∈ X * ,
Proof. Our proof is very similar to that of [3, Prop. 14]: We adapt it here to the fact that our supermartingales take values in R ∪ {+∞} rather than R.
V1. If sup ω∈Γ(s) f (ω) = +∞, the inequality is trivially satisfied. If this is not the case, consider any real M ≥ sup ω∈Γ(s) f (ω) and the real process M that assumes the constant value M. Then clearly M is a supermartingale and moreover lim inf
V1 follows.
V2. If either E V ( f s) or E V (g s) equals +∞, then the inequality is trivially true. So suppose that E V ( f s) < +∞ and E V (g s) < +∞ and consider any real c 1 > E V ( f s) and any real c 2 > E V (g s).
Then there are two supermartingales M 1 and M 2 such that M 1 (s) ≤ c 1 and M 2 (s) ≤ c 2 and moreover lim inf M 1 ≥ s f and lim inf M 2 ≥ s g. Now consider the extended real process M ≔ 
So consider any ω ∈ Ω and any real α 1 and α 2 such that lim inf M 1 (ω) > α 1 and lim inf M 2 (ω) > α 2 . This is always possible because M 1 and M 2 are bounded below. Then there are two natural numbers N 1 and N 2 such that M 1 (ω n 1 ) ≥ α 1 and M 2 (ω n 2 ) ≥ α 2 for all n 1 ≥ N 1 and all n 2 ≥ N 2 . Hence, we have that
Since this holds for any real α 1 and α 2 such that lim inf M 1 (ω) > α 1 and lim inf M 2 (ω) > α 2 , we indeed find that lim inf(
V3. For λ > 0, it suffices to note that M is a supermartingale such that lim inf M ≥ s f if and only if λM is a supermartingale such that lim inf λM
, start by noting that λ f = 0 and hence, because of V1, E V (λ f s) ≤ 0. That E V (λ f s) < 0 is impossible, follows from Lemma 11 and Definition 2.
Hence, we indeed have that E V (λ f s) = 0.
V4. For any M ∈ M b such that lim inf M ≥ s g, we also have that lim inf M ≥ s f , and hence, by
V5. The first and third inequality follow trivially from V1 and the definition of the conjugate lower expectation E V . To prove the second inequality, assume ex absurdo that E V ( f s) > E V ( f s).
which, by V2 and the definition of the conjugate lower expectation
Since, according to our convention, the extended real variable f + (− f ) only assumes values in 0 and +∞, we have that f + (− f ) ≥ 0 and therefore, by V4 and
Since this holds for
. By applying this inequality to f ′ = f + µ and µ ′ = −µ, we also find that 
Proof. Let M b and M ′ b be the sets of supermartingales associated with respectively Q s and Q ′ s .
Then it is clear that, from the definition of a supermartingale, we have that M
With any situation x 1∶n ∈ X * and any (n+1)-measurable extended real variable f that is bounded below,we now associate a local variable f (
X , and we then use Q x 1∶n ( f ) to denote the local upper expectation Q x 1∶n ( f (x 1∶n ⋅)). This allows us to formulate the following result, which shows that the game-theoretic upper expectation E V is compatible with the local models Q s .
Proposition 15. Consider any situation x 1∶n ∈ X * and any (n + 1)-measurable extended real variable f that is bounded below. Then,
Proof. The proof is similar to that of [3, Corollary 3] . Consider any
f . Then it follows from Lemma 11 that, for all x n+1 ∈ X ,
Hence, we have that M (x 1∶n ⋅) ≥ f (x 1∶n ⋅), which implies by E4 and the supermartingale character
Since this holds for any M ∈ M b such that lim inf M ≥ x 1∶n f , it follows from Definition 2 that
. To see that the inequality is an equality, consider the extended real
, and by M (s) = f (x 1∶n+1 ) for any s ∈ X * such that s ⊒ x 1∶n+1 for some x n+1 ∈ X . Then M is a supermartingale because on the one hand, it is bounded below because f is bounded below and Q x 1∶n satisfies E5, and on the other hand,
It is moreover easy to see that lim inf M ≥ x 1∶n f is guaranteed because f is (n + 1)-measurable.
The next theorem shows that the game-theoretic upper expectation E V satisfies a Law of Iterated
Upper Expectations. For its proof, we require the following additional notation and terminology.
We write that s ⊑ t, and say that s precedes t or that t follows s, when every path that goes through t also goes through s. When s ⊑ t and s = t, we write s ⊏ t. When neither s ⊑ t nor t ⊑ s, we say that s and t are incomparable.
Theorem 16. For any f ∈ V and any x 1∶n ∈ X * , we have that
Proof. This was already proven in [3, Theorem 16 ] for a version of global upper expectations with real-valued supermartingales. We here adapt it to our setting. Fix any f ∈ V and any x 1∶n ∈ X * .
We first show that
and hence E V ( f x 1∶n+1 ) ≤ M (x 1∶n+1 ) by Definition 2. Let M ′ be the process that is equal to M for all situations that precede x 1∶n or are incomparable with x 1∶n , and that is equal to the constant M (x 1∶n+1 ) for all situations that follow x 1∶n+1 for some x n+1 ∈ X . Clearly, M ′ is again a supermartingale and moreover
We now prove the other inequality. Again, if E V (E V ( f x 1∶n X n+1 ) x 1∶n ) = +∞ it trivially holds, so we can assume it to be real or equal to −∞. Fix any real α > E V (E V ( f x 1∶n X n+1 ) x 1∶n ) and any ǫ > 0. Then there must be a supermartingale M such that M (x 1∶n ) ≤ α and lim inf M ≥ x 1∶n E V ( f x 1∶n X n+1 ). Consider any such supermartingale. Then for any x n+1 ∈ X , we have that
is either real or equal to +∞ because M is bounded below. If
, it follows from Definition 2 that there is a
is +∞, let M x 1∶n+1 be the constant supermartingale that is equal to +∞ everywhere. So, for all x n+1 ∈ X , we have found a supermartingale M x 1∶n+1 such that M x 1∶n+1 (x 1∶n+1 ) ≤ M (x 1∶n+1 )+ ǫ and lim inf M x 1∶n+1 ≥ x 1∶n+1 f . Let M * be the process that is equal to M + ǫ for all situations that precede or are incomparable with x 1∶n , and that is equal to M x 1∶n+1 for all situations that follow x 1∶n+1 for some x n+1 ∈ X . Then M * is also a supermartingale. Indeed, it is clearly bounded below because M and all M x 1∶n+1 are bounded below and X is finite. Furthermore, for any x n+1 ∈ X , we
and therefore, by E4 and E6, that
Moreover, for all situations s ⊒ x 1∶n , we have by
, and for all s ∈ X * such that s ⊒ x 1∶n+1 for some x n+1 ∈ X ,
All together, we have that
(s) for all s ∈ X * , implying, together with its bounded belowness, that M * is indeed a supermartingale. Also note that lim inf M * ≥ x 1∶n f and that M *
Since this holds for any ǫ > 0 and any real
Corollary 17. For any f ∈ V b , the process P, defined by P(s) ≔ E V ( f s) for all s ∈ X * , is a supermartingale.
Proof. Consider any f ∈ V b . Then P is bounded below because f is bounded below and E V satisfies V5. Moreover, using the notation E V ( f s ⋅) to denote the local variable that assumes the value E V ( f sx) for any x ∈ X , it follows from Proposition 15 and Theorem 16 that
Hence, P is indeed a supermartingale.
Introducing further terminology, for any s ∈ X * , we say that a supermartingale M ∈ M b is an s-test supermartingale if it is non-negative and M (s) = 1. If s = ◻, we simply say it is a test supermartingale. For any s ∈ X * , we say that an event A ⊆ Γ(s) is strictly almost sure (s.a.s.)
we drop the 'within' and simply speak of 'strictly almost sure'. For any two f , g ∈ V, we will then use the notation f ≥ s g s.a.s. -and similarly for ≤ s , > s and < s -to mean that the event {ω ∈ Γ(s)∶ f (ω) ≥ g(ω)} is strictly almost sure within Γ(s).
Lemma 18. Consider any f ∈ V and any s ∈ X * . Then
Proof. Since every supermartingale M that satisfies lim inf M ≥ s f also satisfies lim inf M ≥ s f s.a.s., we clearly have that
so it remains to prove the other inequality. If the right hand side of Equation (6) 
Since lim inf M α ≥ s f s.a.s., there is some s-test supermartingale M * α that converges to +∞ on 
and because ǫM * α is non-negative. Hence lim inf(M α + ǫM * α ) ≥ s f , and consequently E V ( f s) ≤ (M α + ǫM * α )(s). It therefore follows from Equation (7) that
As this holds for any ǫ ∈ R > , we have that E V ( f s) ≤ α, and since this is true for every α ∈ R such that α > inf M (s)∶ M ∈ M b and lim inf M ≥ s f s.a.s. , it follows that
A cut U is collection of pair-wise incomparable situations. For any two cuts U and V, we can define the following sets of situations:
We call a cut U complete if for all ω ∈ Ω there is some u ∈ U such that ω ∈ Γ(u). Otherwise, we call U partial. We will also use the simpler notation s to denote the cut {s} that consists of the single situation s ∈ X * . In this way we can define
.. in a similar way as above. We also write U ⊏ V if (∀v ∈ V)(∃u ∈ U)u ⊏ v. Analogously as before, we say that a path ω ∈ Ω goes through a cut U when there is some n ∈ N 0 such that ω n ∈ U. Proof. We can assume that M is non-negative and that M (t) = 1 without loss of generality.
Proposition 19. Consider any supermartingale
Indeed, because the original supermartingale is bounded below and real in t, we can obtain such a process by translating and scaling -by adding a positive constant and then multiplying the supermartingale by a positive real -the originally considered supermartingale in an appropriate way. This process will then again be a supermartingale because of Lemma 12. Moreover, the new supermartingale will have the same convergence character as the original one.
To start, we associate with any couple of rational numbers 0 < a < b the following recursively constructed sequences of cuts {U
The cuts U a,b k and V a,b k can be partial or complete.
Next, consider the extended real process
for all s ⊐ t. We prove that this process is a non-negative supermartingale that converges to +∞ on all paths ω ∈ Γ(t) such that
For any situation s and for any k ∈ N, when U 
n ⊏ ⋯. Hence, for any situation s we can distinguish the following three cases:
• The first case is that V a,b 1 ⊏ s. Then we have that
• The second case is that V 
• The third case is that U ⊏ s for some k ∈ N. Then we have that
where, again, we used the fact that M is real for any situation s
(s) is non-negative, is trivially satisfied in the first case. To see that this is also true for the third case, observe that 0 < b < M (u is non-negative because of Equation (12). In the second case, it follows from Equations (10), (11) and (12) that
We prove by induction that M
for all ℓ ∈ {1, ..., k}, and therefore, by Equation 
(s) for all s ∈ X * , and hence, combined with its nonnegativity -and therefore bounded belowness -that M is a non-negative supermartingale. 
where the last step follows because M is a supermartingale.
(s), where we have used E5 for the last inequality. Hence, we have that
(s) for all s ∈ X * , and we can therefore infer that M a,b is indeed a non-negative supermartingale.
Let us now show that M a,b converges to +∞ on all paths ω ∈ Γ(t) for which Equation (9) holds.
Consider such a path ω. First, it follows from lim inf M (ω) < a that there exists some n 1 ∈ N such that ω n 1 ⊒ t and M (ω n 1 ) < a. Take the first such n 1 . Then it follows from the definition of (t) goes to +∞ because k goes to +∞.
To finish, we use the countable set of rational couples K ≔ {(a, b) ∈ Q 2 ∶ 0 < a < b} to define the process M * :
with coefficients w a,b
> 0 that sum to 1. Hence, M * is a countable convex combination of the non-negative supermartingales M a,b . By Lemma 12, M * is then a non-negative supermartingale.
It is moreover clear that M * (t) = M (t) = 1, implying, together with its non-negativity, that M * is a t-test supermartingale. We show that M * converges in the desired way as described by the proposition.
If M does not converge to an extended real number on some path ω ∈ Γ(t), then we have
Finally, we show that M * converges in R on every path ω ∈ Γ(t) where M converges to a real number. Fix any such ω ∈ Γ(t). Suppose there is an n ∈ N such that ω n ⊐ t and M (ω n ) = +∞.
Consider the first such n. Hence, M (ω
) is always real. Consider now a couple (a, 
), which in turn implies that So, consider the case where M (ω n ) is real for all n ∈ N 0 such that ω n ⊐ t (the case where
is real for all n ∈ N 0 and all (a, b) ∈ K.
Moreover, M * (ω n ) is then also real for all n ∈ N 0 such that ω n ⊒ t. Indeed, for all n ∈ N 0 such that ω n ⊒ t, M (ω n ) are real numbers that converge in R as n approaches infinity, so
n ⊒ t} is real, and, since M is non-negative, M ≥ 0. If we note that, according to Equation (8) and the non-negativity of M ,
for any n ∈ N 0 such that ω n ⊒ t, then we infer that
for all n ∈ N 0 such that ω n ⊒ t. The last expression is clearly real because M is real. Together with the non-negativity of M * , this implies that M * (ω n ) is indeed real for all n ∈ N 0 such that ω n ⊒ t.
So we have that
are all real for all n ∈ N 0 such that ω n ⊒ t and all (a, b) ∈ K. Taking this into account, we now fix any such n ∈ N 0 and any (a, b) ∈ K, and show
First note that, for any k ∈ N and any v k ∈ V a,b k , we have that
⊏ s ′ for some k ′ < k, then by Equation (12) and the fact that
and therefore that M
(t) and hence, again by the fact that M (u
together, this shows that Equation (15) ⊏ ω ℓ for some k ∈ N, implying by Equation
We separate three cases. If V a,b
, implying by Equation (11) and (12) that
Finally, if V a,b 1 ⊏ ω n , then we find in an analogous way as for the previous case (where U a,b
. Since this holds for any
(ω n ) < 0 and since both infima in Equation (14) are obviously smaller or equal than zero (because the term for ℓ = n is zero), the desired inequality follows.
Since Equation (14) holds for any (a, b) ∈ K, we have that
Note that both sums above exist because all terms are smaller or equal than zero and the coefficients w a,b are larger than zero. Moreover,
where the second equality holds because both sums converge to a real number since M * 
Since this holds for any n ∈ N 0 such that ω n ⊒ t, this implies that 
t-test supermartingale that converges in the desired way as described by the proposition. Proposition 21. For any f ∈ V and any s ∈ X * , we have that
Theorem 20 (Doob's Convergence Theorem). Consider any supermartingale
where M is a supermartingale for which lim M exists within Γ(s).
Proof. The inequality '≤' is trivially satisfied since lim inf M = s lim M for any supermartingale Moreover, for all ω ∈ Γ(s), this process converges in R. Indeed, for any ω ∈ Γ(s), if M does not converge in R, M * converges to +∞ and hence also M ′ because M is bounded below and ǫ is positive. If M does converge in R, it converges either to a real number or to +∞ (convergence to −∞ is impossible because it is bounded below). If it converges to a real number, M * converges in R and hence M ′ also converges in R. If it converges to +∞, then so does M
This holds for any ǫ > 0 and any α > E V ( f s), which implies that indeed
Theorem 22 (Lévy's zero-one law). For any f ∈ V b and any s ′ ∈ X * , the event
Proof. Let c ∈ R be any real constant. Since, for any s ∈ X * , E V (⋅ s) satisfies V6, we have that
because f is bounded below, we can assume without loss of generality that f is a gamble such that inf f > 0.
We now associate with any couple of rational numbers 0 < a < b the following recursively constructed sequences of cuts {U a,b k
, and let
, and therefore
If V a,b k ⊑ t, then, for any x ∈ X , we have either tx ∈ V a,b k
and therefore, by E4 and E5, that 
for all s ⊒ s ′ . We prove that this process is a positive s ′ -test supermartingale that converges to
That T a,b is well-defined follows from the fact that, for any k ∈ N and any s ∈ [V 
it is trivial that ω goes through U a,b
Take the first such n 1 ∈ N. (1) The first case is that s ⊐ V a,b
1 . Then we have
. (17), and, for all ℓ ∈ {1, ..., k}, M
] for some k ∈ N. Then we have
.
As for all ℓ ∈ {1, ..., k}, M
Because inf f > 0 and b a > 1, and because ω goes through all the cuts, we conclude that indeed
To finish, we use the countable set of rational couples K ≔ {(a, b) ∈ Q 2 ∶ 0 < a < b} to define the process T :
with coefficients w a,b > 0 that sum to 1. Hence, T is a countable convex combination of the pos- 
there is at least one couple (a
Proposition 23. For any f ∈ V b , the infimum in Equation (6) is attained.
Proof. Consider any f ∈ V b and the extended real process P defined by P(t) ≔ E V ( f t) for all t ∈ X * . Then P is a supermartingale because of Corollary 17. Moreover, because of Theorem 22 we have that lim inf P ≥ s f strictly almost surely. Since P(s) = E V ( f s), this concludes the proof.
C E V
Our definition of an upper expectation, characterised by axioms E1-E4, implies that, if the state space is finite, it satisfies continuity with respect to non-decreasing sequences that are bounded below (see Proposition 2). Hence, since we assumed the local models Q s to be upper expectations on a finite state space, they satisfy this particular continuity. We now prove that this also holds for the global model E V .
Theorem 24. For any s ∈ X * and any non-decreasing sequence { f n } n∈N 0 in V b that converges point-wise to a variable f ∈ V b , we have that
Proof. The idea of this proof goes back to [9, Theorem 6.6]. As f 0 ∈ V b is bounded below and the sequence { f n } n∈N 0 is non-decreasing, there is an M ∈ R such that f n ≥ M for all n ∈ N 0 and therefore, f is also bounded below by M. Hence, since E V is constant additive [V6], we can assume without loss of generality that f and all f n are non-negative.
That lim n→+∞ E V ( f n s) exists, follows from the non-decreasing character of { f n } n∈N 0 and V4.
Moreover, we have that
and because E V satisfies V4. It remains to prove the converse inequality.
For any n ∈ N 0 , consider the extended real process S n , defined by S n (t) ≔ E V ( f n t) for all t ∈ X * and the extended real process S defined by the limit S(t) ≔ lim n→+∞ S n (t) for all t ∈ X * .
This limit exists because {S n (t)} n∈N 0 is a non-decreasing sequence for all t ∈ X * , due to the monotonicity [V4] of E V . As f n is non-negative for all n ∈ N 0 , S n is non-negative for all n ∈ N 0 because of V5 and therefore S is also non-negative. As a result, S and all S n are non-negative extended real processes.
It now suffices to prove that S is a supermartingale such that lim inf S ≥ s f s.a.s. because it will then follow from Lemma 18 that
This is what we now set out to do.
We first show that S is a supermartingale. S is bounded below because it is non-negative.
Furthermore, for all situations t ∈ X * , we already know that {S n (t ⋅)} n∈N 0 is a non-decreasing sequence that converges to S(t ⋅). Since S n and S are non-negative,we also have that S n (t ⋅),
Then, according to E10 we have that
S n is a supermartingale for all n ∈ N 0 because of Corollary 17, so it follows that Q s (S n (t ⋅)) ≤ S n (t) for all n ∈ N 0 and all t ∈ X * . This implies, together with Equation (19), that
Hence, S is a supermartingale.
To prove that lim inf S ≥ s f s.a.s., we will use Lévy's zero-one law. It follows from Theorem 22 that, for all n ∈ N 0 , there is an s-test supermartingale M n that converges to +∞ on the event
Now, consider the extended real process M , defined by
where the coefficients λ n > 0 sum to 1. Then it follows from Lemma 12 that M is again a non-negative supermartingale. Moreover, it is clear that M (s) = 1 and hence, M is an s-test supermartingale.
We show that M converges to +∞ on all paths ω ∈ Γ(s) such that lim inf m→+∞ S(ω m ) < f (ω).
Clearly, M converges to +∞ on ∪ n∈N 0 A n ≕ A. Consider now any path ω ∈ Γ(s) for which lim inf m→+∞ S(ω m ) < f (ω). Since, as we explained before, S n (t) is non-decreasing in n for all t ∈ X * , we have that, for all m ∈ N 0 , sup n∈N 0 S n (ω 
Then there is some n ω such that
and therefore, we see that also
So ω ∈ A n ω ⊆ A and, as a consequence, M converges to +∞ on ω. Hence, the s-test supermartingale M converges to +∞ on all paths ω ∈ Γ(s) such that lim inf m→+∞ S(ω m ) < f (ω), and therefore lim inf S ≥ s f strictly almost surely.
Corollary 25. For any situation s ∈ X * and any non-negative f ∈ V, we have that
Proof. It follows from V3 that E V (λ f s) = λE V ( f s) for any real λ > 0. Hence, if we let {λ n } n∈N 0 be a non-decreasing sequence of positive reals that converges to +∞, we have that
Moreover, it is clear that {λ n f } n∈N 0 is a non-decreasing sequence of variables in V b that converges to (+∞) f , which implies by Theorem 24 that the left hand side of Equation (21) is equal to
Corollary 26. For any s ∈ X * , the map
Proof. E1 follows from V5. E2 and E4 respectively follow from V2 and V4. E3 follows from V3
for real λ, and from Corollary 25 for λ = +∞.
Lemma 27 (Fatou's Lemma). For any situation s ∈ X * and any sequence { f n } n∈N 0 in V b that is uniformly bounded below, we have that
Proof. Consider the variable g k defined by g k (ω) ≔ inf n≥k f n (ω) for any k ∈ N 0 and all ω ∈ Ω.
Then clearly f = lim k→+∞ g k . Furthermore, {g k } k∈N 0 is a non-decreasing sequence in V b because { f n } n∈N 0 is uniformly bounded below. Hence, we can use Theorem 24 to find that
where the inequality follows because, for all k ∈ N 0 , g k ≤ f k and therefore, because of V4, also
Theorem 28. Consider any s ∈ X * , any f ∈ V and, for every α ∈ R, the variable f α ∈ V defined by
Proof. E V ( f α s) is non-decreasing in α because f α is non-decreasing in α and because E V is monotone [V4], and therefore lim α→−∞ E V ( f α s) exists. Moreover, f α ≥ f for all α ∈ R, implying,
. It therefore only remains to prove the converse inequality.
Then it follows from the definition of E V ( f s) that there is some supermartingale M ∈ M b such that M (s) ≤ c and lim inf M ≥ s f . Since M is bounded below, it immediately follows that there is some α * ∈ R such that lim inf M ≥ α * , and hence also lim inf M ≥ α for all α ≤ α * . Fix any such α ≤ α * . Then it is clear that moreover lim inf M ≥ s f α and it therefore follows from the definition of E V ( f α s) that E V ( f α s) ≤ M (s) ≤ c. Consequently, we also have that lim α→−∞ E V ( f α s) ≤ c, and since this holds for any c > E V ( f s), we conclude that indeed
Lemma 29. Consider any global variable h ∈ V b taking values in the natural numbers. If h(ω) = h(ω)
for any ω ∈ Ω and anyω ∈ Γ(ω
Proof. Assume ex absurdo that sup h = +∞. Then we have that
Since X is finite, there is clearly some x * 1 ∈ X for which sup ω∈Γ(x * 1 ) h(ω) = +∞. Similarly, we also find that
Since X is finite, there is again some x * 2 ∈ X for which sup ω∈Γ(x * 1 x * 2 ) h(ω) = +∞. We can continue in this way and construct a path ω * = x * 1 x * 2 ...x * n ... for which sup ω∈Γ(ω n * )
h(ω) = +∞ for all n ∈ N 0 .
However, h takes values in the natural numbers, so h(ω * ) is real. This implies, together with
This is a contradiction, and therefore sup h is real.
Proposition 30. For any s ∈ X * and any non-increasing sequence { f n } n∈N 0 of n-measurable gambles that converges point-wise to a variable f ∈ V, we have that
Proof. The idea behind the proof of this theorem originates from [2] , where a version of Definition 2 with real supermartingales is used. We here adapt it to our setting. Fix any s ∈ X * . Because { f n } n∈N 0 is non-increasing and E V is monotone [V4], E V ( f n s) is also non-increasing in n and hence the limit lim n→+∞ E V ( f n s) exists. Moreover, because f n ≥ f for all n ∈ N 0 and again E V is monotone [V4], we have that lim n→+∞ E V ( f n s) ≥ E V ( f s). Hence, we are left to show the other inequality. If E V ( f s) = +∞, the inequality trivially holds. If not, we will prove that, for all α ∈ R such that E V ( f s) < α, lim n→+∞ E V ( f n s) ≤ α.
So consider any α ∈ R such that E V ( f s) < α. Then there is a supermartingale M ∈ M b such that M (s) ≤ α and lim inf M ≥ s f . Fix any ǫ > 0 and any ω ∈ Γ(s). Note that f is bounded above because { f n } n∈N 0 is a non-increasing sequence of gambles. Hence, because { f n } n∈N 0 converges point-wise to f , there is, for every real β > f (ω), an index n ′ such that β ≥ f n (ω) for all n ≥ n ′ .
So if lim inf
If lim inf M (ω) is not real, it can only be equal to +∞ because of the bounded belowness of M .
Since f 0 is a gamble, there clearly is an index M(ω) such that M (ω
which by the non-increasing character of { f n } n∈N 0 implies that M (ω
Hence, we conclude that for all ω ∈ Γ(s) and any n ′ ∈ N 0 , there is a natural number n ≥ n
Let ℓ be the length of the string s. Now consider the variable
clear from the argument above, that h takes values in the natural numbers. Moreover, for any
, we have that ω n =ω n and therefore M (ω n ) = M (ω n ) and moreover f n (ω) = f n (ω) because f n is n-measurable. Hence, for any n ∈ N 0 , any ω ∈ Ω and anỹ
). That h(ω) = h(ω) holds is obviously also true for any two paths ω andω outside of Γ(s). Hence, the conditions for Lemma 29 are satisfied and we can therefore infer that sup h < +∞.
). It is also a complete cut because h takes values in the natural numbers. For any situation t ⊒ U, let us write u(t) to denote the unique situation in U such that u(t) ⊑ t. We then let M U be the extended real process defined by
The process M U is bounded below because M is bounded below. Moreover, we have that
Since, for any t ∈ X * , Q t (M (t ⋅)) ≤ M (t) -because M is a supermartingale -and Q t (c) = c for all c ∈ R ≥0 because of E5, it follows that Q t (M U (t ⋅)) ≤ M U (t) for all t ∈ X * . Hence, M U is also a supermartingale.
For any ω ∈ Ω, we now let u(ω) be the unique situation in U such that ω ∈ Γ(u(ω)). Clearly
Therefore, by definition of h, we have that
) ≤ 2ǫ for all ω ∈ Γ(s).
Since { f n } n∈N 0 is non-increasing and h(ω) ≤ sup h for all ω ∈ Ω, we have that
Note that f sup h is an element of { f n } n∈N 0 because sup h is a natural number as shown above. So we have that
Hence, f sup h −2ǫ ≤ s lim M U , which implies, together with M U ∈ M b and V6, that
is non-increasing and E V is monotone [V4], this on its turn results in
lim n→+∞ E V ( f n s) − 2ǫ ≤ α. This inequality holds for any ǫ > 0 and any real α > E V ( f s), so we conclude that indeed lim n→+∞ E V ( f n s) ≤ E V ( f s).
Corollary 31. For any s ∈ X * and any non-increasing sequence { f n } n∈N 0 of finitary gambles that converges point-wise to a variable f ∈ V, we have that
Proof. Consider such a sequence { f n } n∈N 0 that converges point-wise to some f ∈ V. We show,
in an analogous way as we did for the proof of Lemma 8, that there is a non-increasing sequence { f ′ n } n∈N 0 of n-measurable gambles that converges point-wise to f and such that moreover lim n→+∞ E V ( f ′ n s) is equal to lim n→+∞ E V ( f n s). Then, by Proposition 30, we indeed have that
n } n∈N 0 be defined by the following recursive expressions:
otherwise, and
for all n ∈ N. The original sequence { f n } n∈N 0 is a subsequence of { f ′ n } n∈N 0 . Moreover, the additional elements in { f ′ n } n∈N 0 clearly do not change the limit behaviour, nor does it change the non-increasing character. Hence, the limits lim n→+∞ f ′ n and lim n→+∞ f n are equal. The same argument holds to show that lim n→+∞ E V ( f ′ n s) equals lim n→+∞ E V ( f n s). It is moreover clear that { f ′ n } n∈N 0 is a sequence of gambles because { f n } n∈N 0 is a sequence of gambles. Hence, we are left to show that the variables f ′ n are n-measurable. We will do this by induction. f ′ 0 = c is clearly 0-measurable. To prove the induction step, suppose that f ′ n−1 is (n − 1)-measurable for some n ∈ N. Then either we have that f γ(n) is n-measurable, which directly implies that f
n is (n −1)-measurable and therefore automatically n-measurable. This concludes the induction step.
For any f ∈ V and any c ∈ R, we let f ∧c be the variable defined by f ∧c (ω) ≔ min{ f (ω), c} for all ω ∈ Ω. For any countable net { f (m,n) } m,n∈N 0 of gambles, we say that the gamble f ≔ lim (m,n)→(+∞,+∞) f (m,n) is the Moore-Smith limit of { f (m,n) } m,n∈N 0 if, for all ω ∈ Ω and all ǫ > 0, there is a couple (m
We trivially extend this definition to any f ∈ V b by additionaly requiring that, for all ω ∈ Ω such that f (ω) = +∞ and for any α > 0, there is a couple (m * , n * ) ∈ N 2 0 such that f (m,n) (ω) ≥ α for all m ≥ m * and all n ≥ n * .
Lemma 32. Consider any sequence { f n } n∈N 0 in V that converges point-wise to some extended real
Proof. Consider any ω ∈ Ω. If f (ω) ∈ R, fix any ǫ > 0. Then there is an n * ∈ N 0 such that
Then there is an n * ∈ N 0 such that f n (ω) ≥ α for all n ≥ n * . If we now take m * ≥ α, then clearly also f ∧m n (ω) ≥ α for all n ≥ n * and all m ≥ m * . Hence, we can conclude that indeed
Proposition 33. For any s ∈ X * and any f ∈ V b,lim , there is a sequence { f n } n∈N 0 of n-measurable gambles that is uniformly bounded below and that converges point-wise to f , for which
and f n ≤ sup f for all n ∈ N 0 . If inf f ∈ R, then we can moreover guarantee that inf f ≤ f n for all n ∈ N 0 .
Proof. If inf f = +∞, meaning that f = sup f = +∞, it suffices to consider the increasing sequence of gambles {n} n∈N and apply V5 to see that the proposition holds. So suppose that inf f is real. We only have to show that there is a sequence of n-measurable gambles { f n } n∈N 0 that converges point-wise to f such that inf f ≤ f n ≤ sup f for all n ∈ N 0 and lim sup n→+∞ E V ( f n s) ≤ E V ( f s). Indeed, since { f n } n∈N 0 is then uniformly bounded below because inf f is real, we can then apply Lemma 27 to find that also lim inf n→+∞ E V ( f n s) ≥ E V ( f s), and therefore that
We assume without loss of generality that inf f = 0. Indeed, if we prove the proposition for such a variable, we can generalise it towards any extended variable f ′ such that inf f ′ is real because of V6.
According to Lemma 8, there is a sequence of n-measurable gambles {g n } n∈N 0 such that inf f = 0 ≤ g n ≤ sup f for all n ∈ N 0 and such that lim n→+∞ g n = f . Consider the net {g ). Indeed, since h m (ω) ≥ ℓ and ω ∈ Γ(s), we also have thatω ∈ Γ(s), implying by the definition of h m that h m (ω) = h m (ω) = ℓ + m.
We now show by induction that Equation (23) also holds for any m ∈ N 0 , any ω ∈ Γ(s) and anỹ
). It is clear that it holds for m = 0. Now suppose that it holds for some (m − 1) ∈ N 0 and consider any ω ∈ Γ(s) and anyω ∈ Γ(ω h m (ω)
). Note that, because h m (ω) > h m−1 (ω), we also have thatω ∈ Γ(ω h m−1 (ω)
) and hence, by the inductive hypothesis, that h m−1 (ω) = h m−1 (ω).
Moreover, for all n ≤ h n (ω), we have that M m (ω ). As a consequence, we find that g h m (ω) = g h m (ω), implying that g h m is indeed (sup h m )-measurable. That it is a gamble, follows directly from its (sup h m )-measurability and its real valuedness, which on its turn follows from the fact that all g n are gambles. Indeed, Analogously, we can prove that lim m→+∞ g h m (ω) = f (ω) holds if f (ω) = +∞. Hence, we indeed conclude that {g h m } m∈N 0 converges point-wise to f .
Finally, we show that such that E V (g h m s) ≤ E V ( f ∧m s)+ 1 m for all m ∈ N 0 . To do this, we define the following sequence of cuts:
} for all m ∈ N 0 .
Note that U h m is indeed a cut because of Equation (23). Moreover, it is a complete cut because h m (ω) is real for all ω ∈ Ω. For any situation t ⊒ U h m , let us write u h m (t) to denote the unique situation in U h m such that u h m (t) ⊑ t. We use a similar notation for paths; for any ω ∈ Ω, u h m (ω) is the unique situation in U h m such that ω ∈ Γ(u h m (ω)). Then it should be clear that u h m (ω) = ω h m (ω) for all ω ∈ Ω. We will use this later on. Using the cuts U h m , we define, for all either f n+1 = f n , which implies that f n+1 is n-measurable and therefore automatically (n + 1)-measurable. Otherwise, we have that n + 1 = sup h m for some m ∈ N 0 , implying that f n+1 = g h m is (sup h m )-measurable and hence (n + 1)-measurable. This completes the induction step. As a result, we have found a sequence of n-measurable gambles { f n } n∈N 0 that converges point-wise to f , for which inf f = 0 ≤ f n ≤ sup f for all n ∈ N 0 and lim sup n→+∞ E V ( f n s) ≤ E V ( f s).
Proposition 34. Consider any s ∈ X * and any f ∈ V. Then E V ( f s) = inf E V (g s)∶ g ∈ V b,lim and g ≥ s f .
Proof. Because E V is monotone [V4], we have, for any g ∈ V b,lim such that f ≤ s g, that
It therefore follows immediately that E V ( f s) ≤ inf E V (g s)∶ g ∈ V b,lim and g ≥ s f .
It remains to prove the converse inequality.
Consider any M ∈ M b such that lim M (ω) exists for all ω ∈ Γ(s) and such that lim M ≥ s f .
Then we can also guarantee that lim M exists everywhere by simply redefining M (t) ≔ M (s)
for all situations t ⊒ s. Clearly, M then remains to be a supermartingale such that lim M ≥ s f . Let {g n } n∈N 0 be the sequence defined by g n (ω) ≔ M (ω n ) for all n ∈ N 0 and all ω ∈ Ω. Then it is clear that {g n } n∈N 0 is a sequence of n-measurable, and therefore finitary, extended real variables that is uniformly bounded below. Moreover, we have that lim n→+∞ g n (ω) = lim n→+∞ M (ω 
